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This paper compares the fiscal policies implemented by two types of government when 
confronted by consumer uncertainty. Consumers, lacking confidence in their knowledge of the 
stochastic environment, endogenously tilt their subjective probability model away from an 
approximating probability model. The government does not face this uncertainty. Through its 
choice of a labor tax and the supply of one-period public debt, the government manipulates the 
competitive equilibrium allocation and the consumers' probability distortion. I consider two types 
of altruistic government. A "benevolent" government maximizes the consumers' expected utility 
under the approximating probability model, whereas a "political" government maximizes the 
consumers' expected utility under the consumers' subjective probability model. I find that, 
relative to a full-confidence setup, the benevolent government relies more heavily on labor taxes 
to finance fluctuations in spending, while the political government depends more on public debt 
to absorb the fiscal shock. These policies are designed to re-align the consumers' savings 
decisions with their full-confidence values and to reduce the fluctuations in the consumers' 
welfare across states, respectively. 
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1 Introduction:
Within the optimal scal policy literature, consumers are typically endowed with knowledge of the proba-
bility model that characterizes the stochastic equilibrium. That is, the consumers can accurately forecast
the possible state-contingent paths of the endogenous variables, which include prices and policies, as well
as the exogenous variables. This ability is critical because one channel through which policy inuences
the equilibrium is through its e¤ect on the consumersexpectations. By manipulating future labor taxes,
for example, the government alters the consumersexpectations about the path of asset returns. These
beliefs then shape the incentives faced by the consumers in earlier periods, guiding their decisions about
how to allocate wealth across time and state.
The role played by scal policy to inuence the consumersexpectations can be seen in Lucas and Stokey
(1983). In this rational expectations model, it is optimal for the benevolent government to set a fairly
smooth prole of labor taxes across states. This policy reduces the uctuations in the intra-temporal
distortion caused by the linear labor tax. Since taxes are less volatile across states than government
spending, the government relies on public debt to nance the di¤erence. This leads to a primary decit
when spending is high and a primary surplus when spending is low. To sustain this equilibrium, the
consumers must hold the opposite prole of debt, loaning money to the government in the former case
and borrowing money from the government in the latter. For the consumers to choose this pattern of
savings, they must hold a particular set of beliefs about how asset returns move across state and time.
Fiscal policy is designed to generate these beliefs. It does so by manipulating the stochastic discount
factor, which in turn inuences the consumersforecasts of asset returns. Thus, scal policys impact on
consumer beliefs is an integral component of the equilibrium.
Underlying this solution is the assumption that the consumers are condent that they have the correct
probability model in mind when making their decisions. However, one might worry that the equilibrium
and the implied scal policy prescriptions hinge upon the accuracy of consumer beliefs. If, instead,
consumers do not possess model-consistent expectations, they might react according to distorted forecasts
of future policies and prices. This could lead to consumer behavior that undermines the governments
ability to implement a smooth tax rate across states. As a result, consumer uncertainty could potentially
call into question the scal policy prescriptions of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
The goal of this analysis, therefore, is to determine how an altruistic government responds to consumer
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uncertainty. Specically, how should a scal authority balance the distortions caused by the linear labor
tax and consumer uncertainty? An important feature of this paper is that it analyzes two di¤erent types
of altruistic government. By examining a number of di¤erent objective functions for the government,
this paper attempts to disentangle the policy implications of consumer uncertainty from the planners
preferences.
As in Lucas and Stokey (1983), this paper assumes only one source of randomness: a shock to gov-
ernment spending. This shock will be interpreted as an extreme event, implying a large rise or fall in
public expenditures1 . The consumers and the government are both endowed with the same approximat-
ing model, which fully species the probabilities over all possible histories of both the endogenous and
exogenous variables. The government is condent that this approximating model is an accurate descrip-
tion of the economy. The consumers, however, are not. The consumers are unsure about whether the
approximating probability model truly characterizes the equilibrium2 .
One way to formalize the consumersbehavior given their uncertainty is through the multiplier pref-
erences of Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2005, 2007). I will follow their formulation when developing the
consumersdecision problem. The consumers, instead of trusting that the approximating model repre-
sents the truth, believe that the true probability measure lies within a range of measures. Given a nite
amount of data, they worry that any probability model within this range could potentially characterize
the equilibrium. The consumers respond to this type of uncertainty by applying a max-min operator
to their decision problem. In doing so, the consumers endogenously distort their subjective probability
model away from the approximating model3 . This process ensures that they choose a robustallocation,
one that performs well even under the worst-case probability model.
It is assumed that the government is able to commit to a path of scal policy, chosen at time t = 0.
Unlike the consumers, the government does not doubt its approximating model. In solving its optimization
1 I will refer to the high government spending state as warand to the low government spending state as peace.
2There is a substantial experimental literature devoted to understanding how individuals respond to this type of uncer-
tainty. Ellsberg (1961), for example, demonstrates that people prefer to place bets on games with known probabilities rather
than unknown probabilities. These preferences suggest that people respond to uncertainty as if there was no single measure
characterizing the probabilities over events. Camerer and Weber (1992) indicate that this aversion to uncertainty holds
across a wide variety of environments.
3 Importantly, this is a model of doubt, not lack of information. The consumers are aware that they are endowed with
the same approximating model as the government. However, whereas the government is condent in the accuracy of this
model, the consumers are not. Thus, the government has no additional information that it could reveal to the consumers in
order to reduce their uncertainty.
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problem, though, the government does take into account how its choice of scal policy a¤ects the consumers
subjective probability model4 .
The government is altruistic and so maximizes the consumersexpected utility. When the expectations
of the government and consumers coincide, there is a unique objective function for an altruistic government.
When consumers face model uncertainty, though, this is no longer the case. The consumers doubt
leads them to optimize according to a subjective probability model, one that the government believes is
incorrect. In this setting, there are a number of objective functions the government could have. This
paper considers two types. The rst type of planner considered is one that maximizes the representative
consumers expected utility under the approximating probability model. This type of government is
labeled benevolent. The second type of planner considered is one that maximizes the representative
consumers expected utility under the consumers subjective probability model. This type of government
is labeled political.
The benevolent government represents a paternalistic planner, one that rejects the consumersbeliefs
as distorted and sets policy according to what it believes the consumers should prefer. The political
government, although condent in the approximating model, avoids this paternalism. Instead, the political
government maximizes an objective function that is more aligned with the consumersown preferences.
Given the consumersdoubt about the correctness of the approximating probability model, the consumers
might prefer this type of government. The multiplicity in planner objective functions allows me to examine
the interaction between consumer uncertainty and the preferences of the government.
To foreshadow the results described below, the benevolent government relies more heavily on labor taxes
to nance the shock to government spending than would be optimal if the consumers faced no uncertainty.
The benevolent government chooses this volatile labor tax rate in order to reduce the distortion in the
consumerssavings decisions. By increasing the labor tax during war and decreasing it during peace, the
government inuences asset returns, which partially re-aligns the consumerssavings decisions with their
full-condence values.
The political government, on the other hand, chooses the opposite type of policy, opting to nance more
of the shock to spending through public debt. This policy smoothes the consumerswelfare across states,
directly reducing the consumersprobability distortion. As these conclusions make clear, the implications
of consumer uncertainty depend critically on the type of altruism of the planner.
4Given the path of prices and allocation, the consumersprobability distortion is fully revealed to the government.
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This paper ts into a growing literature that examines whether the policy prescriptions derived from
rational expectations models are robust to model uncertainty. This literature, however, largely concen-
trates on a di¤erent issue than the one considered in this paper. Whereas this paper analyzes the impact
of consumer uncertainty, other papers in this literature generally focus on the policy implications of the
government lacking condence in the approximating probability model. For example, Dennis (2007) con-
siders a monetary policy model in which the central bank is unsure about the stochastic process governing
the shocks to the Philipscurve and the Euler equation. In addition, the central bank is also unsure about
the probability model held by the rms. Given this uncertainty, a discretionary central bank reacts more
aggressively to stabilize ination than would be optimal under rational expectations.
Woodford (2010) studies a di¤erent, and novel, type of uncertainty faced by the central bank. In
his model, the central bank is condent about its own model of the economy but is unsure about the
beliefs entertained by the private sector. Not wanting to implement a policy that performs poorly if rms
do have model-inconsistent beliefs, the bank applies a max-min operator to its decision problem. He
nds that this type of uncertainty leads the central bank to restrict the degree to which cost-push shocks
translate into ination relative to a rational expectations model. Other examples in this literature include
Kocherlakota and Phelan (2009) and Orphnides and Williams (2007).
One paper in the literature that discusses the impact of consumer uncertainty on policy is Karantounias,
Hansen, and Sargent (2009). Independently, they also incorporate consumer uncertainty into the scal
policy model of Lucas and Stokey (1983). The focus and scope of their analysis, however, are considerably
di¤erent than mine. First, their paper only analyzes the impact of consumer uncertainty on one type
of government. The goal of my analysis, though, is to compare how di¤erent types of government set
policy when confronted with consumers who face uncertainty. By examining a range of preferences for the
planner, this paper is better able to isolate the impact of consumer uncertainty on scal policy5 . Second,
Karantounias, Hansen, and Sargent (2009) focuses on whether the policy conclusions match some stylized
facts of the empirical literature on US public nance, namely the persistence of scal policy. My analysis
is more normative in approach, focusing on the incentives underlying each governments scal policy.
Svec (2010) further explores the impact of consumer uncertainty on optimal scal policy in a model
5 In my paper, the formulation of the benevolent governments problem overlaps with that of Karantounias, Hansen, and
Sargent (2007). In fact, with a redenition of variables, my solution matches theirs. However, the focus of my analysis is
to contrast the incentives of and policies chosen by di¤erent scal governments facing consumer uncertainty.
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with capital. The governments objective function is the representative consumers expected utility under
the consumerssubjective probability measure. With these preferences, the government optimally relies
more heavily on a private assets tax to nance its spending than would be optimal if consumers were
condent about their probability model. In addition, the government structures the ex-post capital taxes
so that the ex-ante capital tax remains quantitatively near zero. The greater volatility in the private
assets tax allows the government to set a relatively smooth labor tax. This policy reduces the uctuations
in the consumerssubjective welfare, lowering their probability distortion.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the economy and characterizes
the representative consumers problem. The resulting competitive equilibrium constraints hold for both
types of government. Section 3 formulates the benevolent governments problem and discusses the
intuition behind the chosen scal policy. This exercise is repeated for the politicalgovernment in section
4. Section 5 compares the two solutions, focusing on how the incentives of each government lead to
qualitatively di¤erent policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economy:
Time is discrete in this innite-horizon model. There are two types of agents: the government and
an innite number of identical consumers. The only source of randomness in this model is a shock to
government spending, which can take on a nite number of values. Let gt = (g0; :::; gt) represent the
history of shocks up to and including period t. The approximating probability model indicates that the
probability of each history is  (gt). In period 0, government spending is known to be g0 with probability
1. The government must nance its expenditure through either a linear tax on labor, n , or through
state-contingent, one-period debt. In each period, the government supplies the economy with a vector of
these state-contingent bonds b (gt+1 j gt) at prices p (gt+1 j gt) ; 8gt+1; gt; t  0. If b (gt+1 j gt) is held by a
consumer, the government will pay out 1 unit of the consumption good if gt+1 occurs in the following period
and zero if gt+1 does not occur. It is assumed that the government can commit to its history-dependent
scal policy chosen at time 0. There is no capital in this economy.
Consumers are endowed with one unit of time each period, out of which they choose to work or enjoy
leisure, x (gt). For every unit of labor supplied, one unit of output is produced. Feasible allocations must
6









+ gt = 1 (1)
where c (gt) denotes consumption. The consumers wealth is composed of her after-tax labor income
and the value of savings brought into that particular state. Out of her wealth, the consumer chooses an
amount of consumption and savings in the state-contingent bond market.
2.1 The ConsumersModel Uncertainty:
The fundamental novelty of this model relative to Lucas and Stokey (1983) is that the consumers face
model uncertainty. They are endowed with an approximating model that species a probability measure
over future exogenous and endogenous variables. However, the consumers are uncertain whether this
approximating probability model accurately characterizes the equilibrium. They fear that other prob-
ability measures could describe the stochastic nature of the economy. To ensure that these alternative
probability models conform to some degree with the approximating model, restrictions must be placed on
what kind of alternative models are allowed.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2005, 2007), it is assumed that each member of the set of alternative
probability distributions must be absolutely continuous with respect to the approximating model. This
requirement implies that the consumers only fear models that correctly put no weight on events with zero
probability. That is, if scal policy implies that a certain event will never occur, the consumers must also
believe that this is true. The type of alternative model considered, then, allows for di¤erent weights as
long as the approximating model indicates that the event occurs with a weight in between zero and one.
More specically, the alternative models must be absolutely continuous over nite time intervals. This
implies that the alternative models entertained by the consumers cannot be rejected with a nite amount
of data, even if they could be rejected with an innite data set. As indicated by Hansen and Sargent
(2007), this restriction allows model uncertainty to have consequences for policy deep into the future.
Applying the Radon-Nikodym Theorem, there exists a measurable function, Mt, such that the subjec-
tive expectation of a random variable, Xt, can be rewritten in terms of the expectation taken with respect
to the approximating probability model:

E [Xt] = E [MtXt]
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where E [Mt] = 1 and

E is the subjective expectations operator. This equation allows me to reinterpret the
consumersuncertainty as uncertainty about the underlying shock process, rather than uncertainty about
the distribution characterizing the policies and other endogenous variables. Consumers can be thought
of as assigning the correct values to the endogenous variables for any given history of the government
spending shock, even if they are uncertain about the true probability of that history occurring.
By dening an additional term, one can measure the size of the consumers probability distortion





and mt+1 = 1 otherwise. Then, Etmt+1 = 1. This restriction guarantees that the feared probability
distributions are indeed legitimate. With this denition, the one-period distance between the alternative
and approximating models is measured by relative entropy:
t (mt+1)  Etmt+1 logmt+1
This measure is grounded  if mt+1 = 1;8gt+1, then  (mt+1) = 0 and convex. Thus, if  (mt+1) is
small, the set of alternative models considered by the consumer is also small. As  (mt+1) increases, the
set grows larger and the consumers less condent that their approximating model governs the spending
shock.






This distortion measure is used in the multiplier preferences of Hansen and Sargent (2005) and characterizes
how the consumers rank their allocations.












Mt [u (ct; xt) + t (mt+1)]
The coe¢ cient  > 0 is a penalty parameter that indicates the degree to which consumers are uncertain
about the probability measure. A small  implies that the consumers are very unsure about their ap-
proximating model, leading to large probability distortions. A high value of  means that the consumers
8
have more condence about the underlying measure, decreasing the size of the distortion. As  ! 1,
this model could collapse to the rational expectations model of Lucas and Stokey (1983).
2.2 The Consumers Problem:
Out of her wealth, each consumer chooses how much to consume and save in state-contingent public debt.
The consumers wealth is composed of two elements: the after-tax labor income and the value of assets
brought into the period. Given that the production function turns a unit of labor into one unit of output






























Imposing the legitimacy constraint, the consumers problem can be written recursively using the value
function, V (b; g; A):
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where the state variable A represents the set of aggregate state variables that the consumer must track
and comes from the governments problem. The consumer takes these state variables as given, believing
that her decisions cannot a¤ect their values. In tracking the aggregate state variables, the consumer is
able to forecast scal policy after every history.
Because of the max-min operator, we must solve the consumers problem like a Stackelberg problem,
solving the inner minimization stage before we solve the outer maximization stage.
2.2.1 The Minimization Stage:
The minimization problem determines the probability distortion that minimizes the consumers expected
utility for a given allocation. There are two incentives that must be considered when nding this incre-
mental distortion, m0. First, the incremental distortion should be distant from unity in order to lower the
consumers subjective welfare. Second, a convex penalty term penalizes the probability distortion as it
diverges from one. The optimal distortion balances the marginal benet of lowering the consumers sub-





, solves the following rst order condition:






  	 = 0
Combining this condition with the additional constraint
X
g0
 (g0 j g)m0 = 1, we can determine the optimal

















Equation (4) depicts the optimal tilting of the subjective probability measure away from the approxi-
mating model. The size of this tilting depends upon the consumers subjective welfare, V , in each state
in period t + 1. If the allocation in a particular state results in a large subjective welfare relative to
the average across all states, the numerator will be smaller than the denominator, meaning that m0 < 1.
As a result, the consumer places a smaller subjective weight on this state than the approximating model
does. The reverse is true for an allocation that yields a small subjective welfare. Put another way, un-
certainty leads each consumer to increase the subjective weight placed on low welfare states and decrease
the subjective weight placed on high welfare states.
The size of the distortion also depends upon , the penalty parameter. A large  decreases the
probability distortion in all states in t + 1, meaning that m0 is close to 1, 8g0. A small , conversely,
implies that the probability distortions will diverge from 1, meaning that the decisions of the consumer
will drastically di¤er from a full condence setup.
2.2.2 The Maximization Stage:
In this stage, the consumer takes as given the prices and scal policy and chooses her consumption, leisure,
and state-contingent bond holdings. By plugging the optimal distortion into the consumers value function,
the consumer incorporates the forecasted worst-case shock process, determined in the minimization step.
The consumer then chooses an allocation, taking into account the endogeneity of the subjective probability
model. The resulting recursive problem is
V (b; g; A) = max
c;x;b0
8>>>><>>>>:
u (c; x)   log
X
g0












The consumers rst order conditions with respect to c, x, and b0 are
c : uc (c; x)   = 0 (6)
x : ux (c; x)   (1  n) = 0 (7)
b0 :











   p0 = 0 (8)
and the envelope condition is
Vb (b; g; A) = 
As is standard in models that assume the government has access to a distortionary labor tax, the rst
order conditions imply the following intra-temporal tradeo¤ between consumption and leisure:
ux (c; x)
uc (c; x)
= 1  n (9)
A larger tax increases the intra-temporal wedge. The Euler equation when consumers face model uncer-
tainty is
uc (c; x) p
0 =  (g0 j g)uc (c0; x0)m0 (10)
The consumers fears inuence her expected future marginal utility of consumption. For a given price, the
consumer will choose di¤erent path of consumption, savings, and leisure than if she were fully condent
in the approximating probability model.
Given these conditions, I can now dene a competitive equilibrium:
Denition 1 A competitive equilibrium is an allocation
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, and policies fn (gt)g1t=0 such that













2. Given the governments policy and prices, the allocation
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sumers maximization problem, forecasting the response of the malevolent agent, and
3. All markets clear.
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3 The Planners Problem
With the competitive equilibrium dened, I can now discuss the planners problem. The planners problem
is written in its primal representation. This formulation allows the government to directly choose the
representative consumers allocation, taking into account how the consumerssubjective probability model
evolves. Given this choice, the competitive equilibrium constraints then determine the necessary prices
and policies that support the allocation and distortions. It is assumed that the government is able to
commit to this scal policy at time 0.
In the following sections, I consider two types of government altruism. Given each objective function,
the government chooses the competitive equilibrium that maximizes its preferences. With the resulting
allocation and distortions, I back out the prices and policies that support the competitive equilibrium. A
discussion of the results then follows.
3.1 The Benevolent Government:
It is assumed that the objective function for the benevolent government is the consumersexpected utility
under the approximating probability model.
Denition 2 The Ramsey problem of the benevolent government is to choose the competitive equilibrium
that maximizes the expected utility of the representative consumer under the approximating model. The
Ramsey outcome under the benevolent government is the competitive equilibrium that attains the maximum.
Proposition 1 The allocation and distortions in the Ramsey outcome under the benevolent government









































fmt+1Vt+1 + mt+1 lnmt+1g (13)
ct + xt + gt = 1 (14)
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Proof. When setting its policy, the government is restricted in the set of feasible allocations that it can
achieve by the competitive equilibrium constraints. The claim is that those restrictions are summarized
by the constraints (11)  (14). To demonstrate this, I will rst show that any allocation and probability
distortion that satises the competitive equilibrium constraints must also satisfy (11)   (14). (2) holds
with equality in equilibrium. Insert (6), (7), and (8) into (2) to get (11). (12) follows directly from the
optimality condition in the inner minimization, (13) is the consumers Bellman equation, and (14) is the
resource constraint. Thus, (11)   (14) are necessary conditions that the Ramsey outcome must solve.
Going in the other direction, given an allocation and distortions that satisfy (11) (14), policies and prices
can be determined from the representative consumers rst order conditions.
The rst constraint, a period implementability constraint, depicts the transition equation of public debt.
This equation is similar to the constraint that arises when consumers do not face model uncertainty, except
that the expectation of tomorrows value of debt is tilted by the consumersprobability distortion.
The second implementability constraint (13) captures how the consumersvalue function evolves across
time and states. The planner must keep track of the consumersvalue function in order to take into account
their probability tilting. This equation is a new constraint that does not appear in the full condence
framework. The planner also faces the resource constraint and the description of the optimal proba-
bility distortion. The constraints f(11) ; (12) ; (13) ; and (14)g fully characterize the set of competitive
equilibrium restrictions.
3.1.1 Sequential Formulation of the Benevolent Planners Problem:
















 (gt+1 j gt)uc (ct+1; xt+1)mt+1bt+1 + uc (ct; xt) (ct   bt)  ux (ct; xt) (1  xt)
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The rst order conditions are
ct;8t  1 : (15)
0 = uc (ct; xt) + t    tuc (ct; xt) + t 1ucc (ct; xt)mtbt
+t [ucc (ct; xt) (ct   bt) + uc (ct; xt)  ucx (ct; xt) (1  xt)]
xt;8t  1 : (16)
0 = ux (ct; xt) + t    tux (ct; xt) + t 1ucx (ct; xt)mtbt
+t [ucx (ct; xt) (ct   bt) + ux (ct; xt)  uxx (ct; xt) (1  xt)]
Vt;8t  1 : (17)





mt [$t   Et 1mt$t]
mt+1;8gt+1;8t  0 : (18)
0 = tuc (ct+1; xt+1) bt+1    t [Vt+1 +  (1 + lnmt+1)] +$t+1
bt+1;8gt+1;8t  0 : (19)
0 = tmt+1   t+1
The rst order conditions (17) and (19) imply that both Lagrange multipliers on the implementability
constraints (t; t) are martingales under the approximating model:
Ett+1 = t
Et 1 t =  t 1
This result implies that the allocation exhibits persistence. This persistence appears because the benev-
olent government must take into account the endogeneity of the consumersprobability distortion, which
is itself a martingale. Only as  ! 1 do the Lagrange multipliers reduce to constants, eliminating the
persistence. As a result of this persistence, consumer uncertainty leads to variations in the shadow values
of the marginal utility of debt and the consumerswelfare across time and states. This variation is absent
in Lucas and Stokey (1983).
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Beyond the inter-temporal persistence, model uncertainty also imparts additional intra-temporal smooth-
ing. Whereas the implementability constraint is the sole condition that links the allocation across states
in Lucas and Stokey (1983), the probability distortion directly connects the allocation across states. The
linkage is most salient in (17), as the movement of  t depends upon the di¤erence between one states
characteristics and its expectation. Again, only as  !1 does the additional intra-temporal connection
disappear.
The time 0 rst order conditions are
c0 : 0 = uc (c0; x0) + 0    0uc (c0; x0)
+0 [ucc (c0; x0) (c0   b0) + uc (c0; x0)  ucx (c0; x0) (1  x0)]
x0 : 0 = ux (c0; x0) + 0    0ux (c0; x0)
+0 [ucx (c0; x0) (c0   b0) + ux (c0; x0)  uxx (c0; x0) (1  x0)]
V0 (g0) :  0 = 0
In order to determine the specic values of the allocation, prices, policies, and probability distortions,
I must numerically solve this model. Consequently, I formulate the recursive problem of the government
below. This recursive problem uses the fact that the solution is recursive in the Lagrange multipliers
on the implementability constraints to determine which variables should be added to the list of state
variables.
3.1.2 Recursive Formulation of the Benevolent Planners Problem:
In deriving the recursive form of the governments optimization problem, I assume that government expen-
ditures follow a Markov process with transition matrix . Due to the time-inconsistency of the planners
problem, I apply the Marcet and Marimon (1998) procedure to the implementability constraints. The
co-state variable on (11) is   with a state-contingent increment of g. The subscript g implies a state-
contingent value in period t  1. The co-state variable on (13) is    with a state-contingent increment of
 g. An ex-ante value function is necessary to account for probability distortion, which connects all states
in a particular period.
15
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8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
u (cg; xg) + g [cg + xg + g   1] +   [uc (cg; xg)mgbg]
+g [uc (cg; xg) (cg   bg)  ux (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
    [mgVg + mg lnmg] +  g [Vg   u (cg; xg)]
+$g






375+ W  g; g; g
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
The initial values of the co-state variables are 0, representing the assumption that the planner at time t=0
is not bound by any previous promises. The rst order and envelope conditions from this problem are
described in Appendix A.
3.1.3 Model Solution and Discussion:
In order to understand how consumer uncertainty a¤ects optimal scal policy, this section compares
the rational expectations equilibrium with the equilibrium under consumer uncertainty. To ease the
exposition, assume a simple process for government spending:
gt = 0;8t 6= T
gT =
8<: G;with probability 0;with probability 1  
9=;
Additionally, b0 = 0, so that consumers have no debt or assets in the initial period.
I will rst discuss the rational expectations solution. As shown in Lucas and Stokey (1983), the
allocation depends only upon the current value of the government spending shock. This means that there
are two possible values for consumption and leisure: fc (0) ; x (0)g and fc (G) ; x (G)g. Using (9), the tax
rate also takes on two values: n (0) and n (G). As government spending is zero for all periods except
T, the governments positive tax n (0) yields a surplus at each of these dates. The surplus, equal to
n (0) (1  x (0)), is loaned to the consumers in each period t < T at an interest rate of 1 , in addition to
the accumulated assets from the previous period.
In period T-1, the government uses its accumulated assets to obtain insurance from the consumers




can be redeemed if gT = G. In addition to using its accumulated wealth, the government nances the cost
of this insurance through period T-1s primary surplus and through issuing debt that pays o¤ if gT = 0.
The price of this debt is  (1  ).
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In period T, the allocation depends upon whether or not the shock occurs. If gT = G, the government
runs a primary decit n (G) (1  x (G)) G < 0. This decit is nanced partially by the interest repay-
ment on the loan made in the previous period and partially by selling additional debt to the consumers.
For each period t > T , the government collects tax revenues and pays o¤previous debt through its primary
surplus. If gT = 0, though, the government uses its primary surplus and additional borrowed money from
the consumers to nance its previous debt from that period forward.
Viewing this result from an insurance perspective, the governments chosen prole of tax and debt
mitigates the cost of the spending shock by spreading the intra-temporal distortion across time and states.
Rather than having no distortion when gt = 0 and a large distortion when gT = G, the government
charges a positive tax on labor income in all periods leading up to T. In period T-1, these assets are
then used to buy insurance from the consumers, who agree to pay a fraction of the cost of the spending
shock if it occurs. The additional funds come from tax revenue and from borrowing money from the
consumers in period T. Thus, under rational expectations, a primary role of state-contingent debt is to
provide insurance, allowing the government to reduce its dependence on the linear labor tax to nance the
spending shock.
Model uncertainty complicates this simple relationship. In addition to the insurance incentive de-
picted above, the benevolent government also seeks to mitigate the impact of the consumersprobability
distortion. The government therefore must use scal policy to balance the social costs stemming from
both the linear labor tax and from model uncertainty.
To see how these tradeo¤s are balanced, I have computed the solution to the benevolent governments
problem and have graphed the solutions below. In calculating these solutions, I have assumed that the
consumers have the following CRRA preferences:
u (c; x) =
c1 
1   + 
x1 
1   :










Depending on the value of , this process could resemble an iid shock to government spending or an AR(1)





. In the numerical calculations, three values of the shock are considered. The probability
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of being hit by the high spending shock is 17%, which, because of symmetry, is also the probability of
being hit by the low shock. In the graphs below, I plot only the solutions associated with a high value
of spending (labeled "war") and a low value of spending (labeled "peace"). Consumers begin with no






 = 1  = 0




Table 1: Parameter values
An important feature of the numerical calculations is to dene the true probability model. The
government is condent that the approximating probability model is correct, while the consumers worry
about a range of alternative probability models. Depending on what model is chosen, the governments
condence could be well-placed or the consumersfear could be justied. For numerical simplicity, this
paper assumes that the approximating probability model happens to be correct. This fact will tilt the
welfare results in favor of the benevolent government, as its objective function uses the approximating
probability model.
To understand how the solution changes relative to the Lucas and Stokey (1983) benchmark, I have
plotted the solutions as a function of the level of consumer uncertainty. When log(theta) is large, the
consumers are condent in the approximating model, and the equilibrium approaches the rational expec-
tations solution discussed above. As log(theta) falls, however, the consumers are increasingly uncertain
about the probability model. Because this larger uncertainty leads to larger behavioral distortions (from
the vantage point of the benevolent government), the government becomes more concerned about the costs
stemming from model uncertainty.
As analytically shown above, the consumersuncertainty leads them to tilt their subjective probabilities
away from the approximating model. This probability distortion can be seen in Figure 1. As log(theta)
falls, the consumers increase the weight placed on the high government spending state and decrease the
weight placed on the low government spending state. Thus, the consumers worry that war is more likely
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and peace is less likely than indicated by the approximating probability model.
Figure 1: Consumersincremental probability distortion for di¤erent levels of 
One important consequence of this probability tilting is that the consumers choose a di¤erent prole
of savings than would be optimal if they were condent in the approximating probability model. For the
same price level, because the consumers place a higher subjective probability on war, they would like to
increase their holdings of the war-contingent asset. Similarly, because the consumers place less weight on
the state of peace, they desire fewer of these state-contingent assets. These shifts in demand, in return,
have implications for the prices and returns of the state-contingent assets. As seen in the pricing equation,
(10), the increase in demand for the war-contingent bond raises the price of the war-contingent bond, while
the decrease in demand for the peace-contingent bond lowers the price of the peace-contingent bond. As
a result, the returns on the war-contingent bond falls and the peace-contingent bond rises.
Critically, this savings prole undermines the governments ability to obtain insurance against its
spending shock. In the full-condence framework, the benevolent government would like to buy war-
contingent debt (to be paid o¤ by the consumers in the event of war) and sell peace contingent debt
(to be paid o¤ by the government in the event of peace). This prole enables the government to set a
smooth labor tax rate. However, as indicated above, model uncertainty leads consumers to desire the
exact opposite prole of debt. The consumers, in their uncertainty about the true probability distribution,
want to save in a manner that makes it di¢ cult for the government to use public debt as insurance against
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the scal spending shock.
Given this tension, how does a benevolent government resolve the competing uses for public debt?
The solution hinges on the fact that the benevolent governments objective is to maximize the consumers
expected utility under the approximating probability model. Because the benevolent government optimizes
with respect to this model, it distrusts the consumerssubjective probability model and so believes that
the consumers are distorting their savings prole. Consequently, the benevolent government attempts
to use its scal policy instruments to re-align the consumerssavings decisions with those that would be
optimal under the approximating probability model. It accomplishes this by manipulating the prices
and returns on debt, as seen in Figure 2. Specically, scal policy is designed to raise (lower) the price
of war-contingent (peace-contingent) assets. The higher price on war-contingent assets discourages the
consumers from holding this debt instrument. This higher price also allows the government to increase
the amount of money it loans to the consumers that they must repay during times of war. This represents
the insurance that the government gains as a result of its policy. Conversely, the lower price on peace-
contingent assets encourages the consumers to loan money to the government that it must repay during
times of peace. This represents the premium that the government must pay for the insurance.
Figure 2: Price and return on debt for di¤erent levels of 
To be clear, two factors drive the movement in state-contingent asset prices. The rst factor is that
the consumerssubjective probability model increases the demand for war-contingent bonds and decreases
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the demand for peace-contingent bonds. This puts upward pressure on the price of war-contingent assets
and downward pressure on the price of peace contingent assets. The second factor is that the government
implements a policy that intensies these price movements, driving the prices on war-contingent (peace-
contingent) assets even higher (lower). These two factors are decomposed in Figure 3. This graph plots
the war-contingent asset price under two di¤erent scenarios. The solid line, labeled "Beliefs", depicts
the movement in the price due purely to the distorted beliefs of the consumers. This line is obtained
by multiplying the stochastic discount factor that arises when consumers are condent in the probability
model with their probability distortion across di¤erent levels of 6 . The dotted line, labeled "Policy",
depicts the price of the war-contingent asset, taking into account both the consumersbeliefs and the scal
policy.
Figure 3: Decomposing price movements into beliefs and policy
The question remains as to how the government uses the state-contingent labor tax rate to accomplish
the price movements discussed above. Relative to the policy chosen when consumers face no uncertainty,
model uncertainty leads the government to implement a relatively high (low) labor tax rate conditional
on war (peace), as seen in Figure 4. This policy a¤ects the allocation chosen by the consumers in each
6This relative contribution of beliefs in price movements is only approximate. By keeping the stochastic discount factor
constant at the  !1 value, I am assuming that the allocation remains at its "certainty" level even though the consumers
uncertainty is growing. However, the probability distortions and the allocation move together, making it di¢ cult to separate
the role of beliefs and policy. This exercise is merely meant to hint at the two factors that drive price movements.
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state. As a result, the stochastic discount factor moves in such a way as to raise the war-contingent bond
price and lower the peace-contingent bond price.
Figure 4: Optimal scal policy implemented by the benevolent government for di¤erent levels of 
To elucidate this point, consider the increase in the war-time tax in T+1. The higher tax encourages
consumers to enjoy more leisure during wars because the after-tax marginal return on labor has fallen.
Due to the decrease in labor income, consumers reduce their consumption. This change then a¤ects
the price of the war-contingent debt in period T. For a given marginal utility of consumption at T,
the increase in the labor tax rate in war will raise the marginal utility of consumption at T+1, causing
the price of war-contingent debt to rise. Consumers, faced with the increased price and lower return
on war-contingent debt, choose to hold less of this debt than if the labor tax had not increased. The
opposite prole of incentives holds true in the event of peace. In e¤ect, the government sets scal policy
to discourage consumers from holding war-contingent debt and from borrowing peace-contingent debt,
partially reversing the savings distortion.
The changes in the labor tax rate have important macroeconomic implications. First, the uctuations
in the primary decit are less pronounced than what would be optimal if consumers were condent in
their knowledge of the stochastic environment. Second, relative to the full-condence framework, the
consumers decrease their labor supply during times of war and increase it during times of peace. This has
the implication of reducing the volatility of output across state. Third, the movement in the consumers
consumption matches that of their labor supply: consumption is lower during war and higher during peace
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relative to the case in which consumers face no model uncertainty.
The conclusions described above characterize the volatility of the solutions at a particular point in
time. Below, I compare the impulse response functions under di¤erent degrees of model uncertainty. To
create these response functions, I assume that government spending is equal to its average, gt =
 
g , for all
periods except period 1, at which time g1 = ghigh. The spending prole associated with this one-period
war can be seen in the top left graph in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Comparing the policy impulse response functions to an increase
in government spending when  !1 and  = 10
During periods of war, the benevolent government raises the labor tax rate to help nance the spending
shock. Relative to the case in which consumers completely understand the shock process, model uncer-
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tainty leads to a higher spike in the tax rate. This increase, although partially o¤set by a decrease in
labor supply, results in a rise in labor tax revenues. As indicated above, the benevolent government relies
more heavily on labor taxes to nance the spending shock when consumers face model uncertainty.
An additional feature of these impulse response functions that is worthy of note is that the levels of
persistence di¤er across the two models. When consumers are certain, the post-war policy returns to
its pre-war levels after the shock ends. This is not the case when consumers face uncertainty. Instead,
the war-time labor tax remains higher than its full condence value for a number of periods after the
one-period war. This persistence translates into a prolonged period of decreased consumption and labor
hours for the consumers.
3.2 The Political Government:
An implication of model uncertainty is that the consumerssubjective expectation could di¤er from the
true expectation. This distinction leads to some exibility as to the objective function of an altruistic
government. The previous section modeled a benevolent government that maximizes the consumers
expected utility under the approximating probability model. This objective function leads the government
to choose a volatile tax rate that is meant to manipulate the consumersexpectations about bond returns.
This section describes the decision problem of a political government, which maximizes the consumers
expected utility under their own subjective probability model. This objective function is more aligned with
the preferences of the consumers than the paternalistic objective function of the benevolent government.
In studying the equilibrium consequences of this change, I follow the same steps as above. I begin
this section by formulating both the sequential and recursive versions of the planners problem. Then,
I compute the numerical solutions of this model, comparing the equilibrium to that in a full condence
setup.
Denition 3 The Ramsey problem of the political government is to choose the competitive equilibrium that
maximizes the expected utility of the consumers under the consumers subjective probability model. The
Ramsey outcome under the political government is the competitive equilibrium that attains the maximum.












































fmt+1Vt+1 + mt+1 lnmt+1g
Mt+1 = mt+1Mt
ct + xt + gt = 1
The proof is similar to the previous one  except one must sum across t to derive the rst imple-
mentability constraint and so is suppressed. The transversality condition imposed here is
limT!1
TMTT pT bT = 0
It is clear from this proposition that the government places the same weights on future events as the rep-
resentative consumer does, even though the government does not share the consumerslack of condence.
The rst constraint is the innite-time implementability constraint. This constraint di¤ers from the ra-
tional expectations version because the distortion Mt a¤ects the perceived probability of each history. In
addition, there is one constraint that must be applied to the political governments problem that was not
applied to the benevolent governments problem. This constraint tracks the movement in Mt.
3.2.1 Sequential Formulation of the Political Planners Problem:
The objective function of the political government leads to the following sequential problem, in which the
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The rst order conditions for this problem are
ct;8t  1 :
0 = uc (ct; xt) +
t
Mt
   tuc (ct; xt)





;8t  1 :
0 = ux (ct; xt) +
t
Mt
   tux (ct; xt)
+ [ucx (ct; xt) ct + ux (ct; xt)  uxx (ct; xt) (1  xt)]
mt+1;8t  0 :
0 =   t [Vt+1 +  (1 + logmt+1)] +$t+1   t+1
Vt;8t  1 :
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Just as in the benevolent governments rst order conditions,  t is a martingale, this time with respect
to the subjective expectation. This implies that  t 1 is a state variable in the recursive version of
the problem. Interestingly, the level of the probability distortion, Mt, disappears from the rst order
conditions. This is because the planner does not seek to re-align the consumersexpectation with the
approximating model, since the two agents optimize with respect to the same probability model. As a
result, the planner does not need a third state variable to track the level of the distortion. Thus, the
corresponding recursive problem only has two state variables.
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3.2.2 Recursive Formulation of the Political Planners Problem:
The planners problem in recursive form is






 (g j g )
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
mgu (cg; xg) + g [cg + xg + g   1]
+mg [uc (cg; xg) cg   ux (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
    [mgVg + mg lnmg] +mg g [Vg   u (cg; xg)]
+$g






375+ mgW ( g; g)
9>>>>>>>>>>>=>>>>>>>>>>>;
The rst order and envelope conditions from this problem are described in Appendix B.
The solution to this problem is indexed by the multiplier . For each value of , the rst order conditions
imply an optimal allocation. In order to solve for the correct value of , the one that corresponds to the
initial level of debt held by the consumers, I will nd the value such that the implementability constraint is
satised with equality. For this , the allocation satises all constraints and yields the highest subjective
welfare for the consumers.
3.2.3 Model Solution and Discussion:
The solution to the political governments problem has been calculated using the same utility function,
government spending process, and parameter values as for the benevolent government problem.
Given that the preferences of the two agents are aligned, the intuition underlying the chosen scal
policy is relatively straight-forward. To illustrate the logic behind the solution, I rst go through a
small thought experiment. Upon completion, I give a more detailed description that characterizes how
the choice of scal policy shapes the economys path and maximizes the consumerssubjective expected
utility.
In Lucas and Stokey (1983), it is shown that public debt should be used as insurance against the
spending shock. This insurance allows the government to reduce the uctuations in the labor tax rate,
decreasing the volatility of the intra-temporal distortion. Because of the concavity of the consumersutility
function, a smooth intra-temporal distortion comes with the smallest welfare cost for the consumers.
The political government faces an additional reason to limit the volatility in the tax rate: a smooth
labor tax reduces the consumersprobability distortion. This, in turn, has the direct e¤ect of increasing
the consumerssubjective expected utility.
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To see this, rst consider the opposite situation. Consider a tax prole that results in a volatile
allocation and welfare prole across states. The consumers, in their uncertainty, respond to this volatility
by decreasing the weight they place on the high welfare state and increasing the weight they place on
the low welfare state. This implies that the consumerssubjective welfare is relatively low, since it is a
weighted (weighted by the consumerssubjective probability model) average of the stateswelfare.
Now, consider the alternative: the government changes its scal policy by lowering the labor tax in war
and raising the tax in peace. This tax prole leads to a smoother allocation for the consumers, reducing
the volatility of their subjective welfare across state. As a result, the consumers do not fear the low
welfare state as much because reaching that state is no longer as harmful. This means that, for a given
level of model uncertainty, the consumers reduce their incremental probability distortion. This leads to a
larger subjective welfare for the consumers.
This intuition can be seen graphically below. As before, I have plotted the equilibrium solutions
for di¤erent levels of consumer uncertainty. A large  implies that the consumers are condent in their
approximating model. As  falls, the consumers are increasingly uncertain about the true model and so
raise their probability distortion.
The logic above suggests that the planner decreases (increases) the labor tax in war (in peace), relative
to when consumers face no uncertainty. Although the tax rate changes are partially o¤set by the change
in labor supply, the new policy yields a less volatile prole of tax revenues across states. This can be
seen in Figure 6. One direct implication of this tax revenue prole is that the volatility of the primary
decit has increased relative to when consumers are condent about the probability model. This means
that the government borrows more from consumers to nance its high spending and saves more during
low spending states. Further, the more uncertainty the consumers face, the greater the volatility of the
primary decit.
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Figure 6: Optimal scal policy implemented by the political government for di¤erent levels of 
Critically, this choice of scal policy is meant to reduce the volatility of the consumerswelfare across
states, since this decreases the size of the consumersprobability distortion. As shown in Figure 7, the
combination of raising the consumers consumption and labor supply during war evidently leads to a
smaller decrease in welfare than the peace-time decrease in consumption and labor supply.
Figure 7: Consumer welfare and probability distortion for di¤erent levels of 
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In the graphs below, I plot the impulse response functions to a positive government spending shock
under two di¤erent degrees of model uncertainty. Again, for all periods except period 1, gt =
 
g . In
period 1, there is an unexpected increase in government spending so that g1 = ghigh. The line associated
with consumers facing a large degree of model uncertainty is labeled "Uncertain", while the line associated
with consumers completely understanding the spending process is labeled "Certain".
Figure 8: Comparing the policy impulse response functions to an increase
in government spending when  !1 and  = 10
As discussed above, a positive, one-period war leads the political government to increase its labor tax.
This increase, though, is smaller when consumers face uncertainty. Even after the shock has passed, the
labor tax is persistently lower when the consumers face model uncertainty. The same results hold for
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labor tax revenues, as seen in the bottom left graph of Figure 8. This result suggests that the government
must nance a larger portion of the war through contemporaneous borrowings.
4 Model Comparison:
This section briey compares the scal policies implemented by the benevolent and political governments.
Both governments seek to use their scal instruments in order to minimize two social costs. First, each
government wants to minimize the distortion that arises when nancing its spending with a linear labor
tax. Second, each government wants to minimize the costs associated with consumer uncertainty.
Even though both governments have similar goals, the implied optimal scal policy for each government
is vastly di¤erent. The fundamental reason behind this is a di¤erence in preferences: the expectation used
in the political governments objective function is aligned with the consumersexpectation, while the same
does not hold for the benevolent government. This alignment is critical because it determines whether
or not the government wants to correctthe behavior of the consumers. If the government does not seek
to re-align the consumersbehavior with what is optimal when the consumers face no uncertainty, then
the task of the government is straight-forward: minimize the uctuations in the consumers subjective
welfare across states. This requires a smooth prole of labor taxes across states. Once accomplished,
the consumersprobability distortion shrinks because the consumers are relatively indi¤erent about which
state occurs. The reduced distortion increases the subjective welfare of the consumers.
Figure 9 plots the variance of the consumersvalue function across both types of government. As can
be seen, the political government smoothes the consumerswelfare across states.
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Figure 9: Comparing the consumerssubjective welfare under the benevolent and political governments
The benevolent government, though, responds in the opposite manner. The benevolent government
does not attempt to reduce the uctuations in the consumerssubjective welfare, but instead increases
that variance. This action comes with the cost of increasing the probability distortion of the consumers.
The benevolent government, though, is willing to accept a larger distortion due to consumer uncertainty
because it gains something more valuable in return: the government alters the consumersexpectations
so that their savings decisions are now more aligned with the full-condence setup. This is important
to the benevolent government because it optimizes with respect to a di¤erent expectation than does the
consumer. Thus, the alignment of the expectations is a critical factor in understanding whether the
government wants to reduce or increase the consumerswelfare uctuations across states.
The degree to which the government wants to smooth the consumerswelfare determines, in turn, the
optimal correlation between the labor tax and government spending. Because the political government
wants to smooth welfare, its labor tax must remain fairly smooth across states and so the correlation
remains small. Intuitively, this implies that the labor tax is not used to absorb much of the scal
shock. Rather, the political government must rely on its borrowings from consumers to nance the
shock. Conversely, the benevolent government sets a more volatile labor income tax, raising the tax rate
in states of war and lowering it in states of peace. As the correlation between the labor tax rate and
government spending is large, the benevolent government does use the tax rate to help absorb the scal
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shock. Evidence of this can be seen in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Comparing the degree to which labor taxes nance government
spending under the benevolent and political governments
4.0.4 Welfare Comparison:
This section examines the welfare consequences of consumer uncertainty across the benevolent and political
governments. One would expect that the benevolent governments policy should achieve a higher welfare
for the consumers than the political governments policy. This is because the spending process happens
to evolve according to the model used in the benevolent governments problem. The question then is the
size of the welfare cost associated with political government relative to the benevolent government. To
determine this value, I simulate the path of the economy 100 times. For each simulation, the economy runs
for 200 periods. In each of those periods, I calculate the consumersperiod utility u (ct; xt). Discounting
these values back to time 0, I obtain the consumerslifetime utility. I arrive at the average lifetime welfare
by averaging this value across all simulations. I compare this number to W0, the benevolent governments
value of the value function at time 0, which is equal to the consumersexpected utility under the true
probability measure. The values are listed in Table 2.
Benevolent government Political Government
Welfare -89.1815 -89.2428
Table 2: Welfare comparisons under the benevolent and political governments
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As predicted, the welfare of the consumers is lower under the political government. Following the Lucas
treatment, the percentage increase in consumption that must be given to the consumers living under the
political government to make them indi¤erent to living under the benevolent government is 0.02% per
period.
5 Conclusion:
This paper compares the scal policies chosen by two types of altruistic government when confronted with
consumer uncertainty. The rst government, labeled a benevolent government, maximizes the consumers
expected utility under the approximating probability model. The second government, labeled a political
government, maximizes the consumersexpected utility under the consumerssubjective probability model.
Even though both governments face the same distortions in the economy, each responds in a dramatically
di¤erent way. The benevolent government increases the volatility of the labor tax, which smoothes the
uctuations in the primary decit across states. The political government, conversely, decreases the
volatility of the labor tax, which amplies the uctuations in the primary decit.
Fundamentally, these stark policy di¤erences hinge upon whether the probability model used by the
government is aligned with the subjective probability model of the consumers. In the case of the benevolent
government, the two measures do not coincide. This leads the benevolent government to choose a policy
that correctsthe behavior of the consumers. That is, the planner attempts to re-align the decisions of the
consumers with their full-condence values. The most critical decision that the benevolent government
wants to re-align is the consumerssavings decision. To do this, the planner sets policy to raise the price
of the war-contingent bond and lower the price of the peace-contingent bond. These movements inuence
the returns on these bonds, reducing the degree to which the consumerssavings prole is di¤erent from
its full-condence value.
In the case of the political government, the two probability measures coincide. Because of this, the
political government does not attempt to correct the consumers behavior. Rather, the government
chooses policy that reduces the consumersprobability distortion. This is benecial because it prevents
the consumers from hurting their subjective welfare due to their worries about the future.
In this model, I have assumed that the actual stochastic process for the government spending shock
happens to be the same as the approximating probability model. As such, the governments condence in
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its probability model is well-placed. This assumption also implies that the policy chosen by the benevolent
government leads to higher consumer welfare than the policy chosen by the political government. This
need not be the case, though. If the actual process does not correspond to the approximating model,
then the governments condence would be misplaced. In this situation, the political governments policy
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7 Appendix A:
This appendix describes the rst order and envelope conditions from the benevolent planners recursive
problem.
The rst order conditions are
cg : 0 = uc (cg; xg) + g +  ucc (cg; xg)mgbg    guc (cg; xg) (20)
+g [ucc (cg; xg) (cg   bg) + uc (cg; xg)  ucx (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
xg : 0 = ux (cg; xg) + g +  ucx (cg; xg)mgbg    gux (cg; xg) (21)
+g [ucx (cg; xg) (cg   bg) + ux (cg; xg)  uxx (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
mg : 0 =  uc (cg; xg) bg      [Vg +  (1 + lnmg)] +$g (22)
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bg : 0 =  mg   g (24)
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The envelope conditions can be combined with (25) and (26) to retrieve the implementability constraints.
It can be shown that the other four rst order conditions are equivalent to those in the sequential formu-
lation. As in the sequential version, the co-state variables are martingales.
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+ 0 [V0   u (c0; x0)] + 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9>>>=>>>;
The rst order conditions are
c0 : 0 = uc (c0; x0) + 0 + 0 [ucc (c0; x0) (c0   b0) + uc (c0; x0)  ucx (c0; x0) (1  x0)]   0uc (c0; x0)
x0 : 0 = ux (c0; x0) + 0 + 0 [ucx (c0; x0) (c0   b0) + ux (c0; x0)  uxx (c0; x0) (1  x0)]   0ux (c0; x0)
V0 : 0 =  0
0 : 0 = uc (c0; x0) (c0   b0)  ux (c0; x0) (1  x0) + W (0; 0; g0)
 0 : 0 = V0   u (c0; x0) + W  (0; 0; g0)
37
8 Appendix B:
This appendix describes the rst order and envelope conditions from the political planners recursive
problem.
The rst order conditions are
cg : 0 = uc (cg; xg)   guc (cg; xg) +
g
mg
+ [ucc (cg; xg) cg + uc (cg; xg)  ucx (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
xg : 0 = ux (cg; xg)   gux (cg; xg) +
g
mg
+ [ucx (cg; xg) cg + ux (cg; xg)  uxx (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
mg : 0 = u (cg; xg) +  [uc (cg; xg) cg   ux (cg; xg) (1  xg)]
    [Vg +  (1 + lnmg)] +  g [Vg   u (cg; xg)] +$g + W ( g; g)








 (g j g )mg$g
#
 g : 0 = Vg   u (cg; xg) + W  ( g; g)
where the envelope condition is
W  (  ; g ) =  
X
g
 (g j g ) [mgVg + mg lnmg]
These rst order conditions are equivalent to those derived in the sequential formulation.






u (c0; x0) + 0 [c0 + x0 + g0   1]
+ [uc (c0; x0) (c0   b0)  ux (c0; x0) (1  x0)]
+ 0 [V0   u (c0; x0)] + W ( 0; g0)
9>>>=>>>;
and the associated rst order conditions are
c0 : 0 = uc (c0; x0) + 0 +  [ucc (c0; x0) (c0   b0) + uc (c0; x0)  ucx (c0; x0) (1  x0)]   0uc (c0; x0)
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x0 : 0 = ux (c0; x0) + 0 +  [ucx (c0; x0) (c0   b0) + ux (c0; x0)  uxx (c0; x0) (1  x0)]   0ux (c0; x0)
V0 : 0 =  0
 0 : 0 = V0   u (c0; x0) + W  ( 0; g0)
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